Designing suitable reward functions for numerous interacting intelligent agents is challenging in real-world applications. Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) in mean field games (MFGs) offers a practical framework to infer reward functions from expert demonstrations. While promising, the assumption of agent homogeneity limits the capability of existing methods to handle demonstrations with heterogeneous and unknown objectives, which are common in practice. To this end, we propose a deep latent variable MFG model and an associated IRL method. Critically, our method can infer rewards from different yet structurally similar tasks without prior knowledge about underlying contexts or modifying the MFG model itself. Our experiments, conducted on simulated scenarios and a real-world spatial taxi-ride pricing problem, demonstrate the superiority of our approach over state-of-the-art IRL methods in MFGs.

The rising rate of drug-related deaths in the United States, largely driven by fentanyl, requires timely and accurate surveillance. However, critical overdose data are often buried in free-text coroner reports, leading to delays and information loss when coded into ICD (International Classification of Disease)-10 classifications. Natural language processing (NLP) models may automate and enhance overdose surveillance, but prior applications have been limited. A dataset of 35,433 death records from multiple U.S. jurisdictions in 2020 was used for model training and internal testing. External validation was conducted using a novel separate dataset of 3,335 records from 2023-2024. Multiple NLP approaches were evaluated for classifying specific drug involvement from unstructured death certificate text. These included traditional single- and multi-label classifiers, as well as fine-tuned encoder-only language models such as Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) and BioClinicalBERT, and contemporary decoder-only large language models such as Qwen 3 and Llama 3. Model performance was assessed using macro-averaged F1 scores, and 95% confidence intervals were calculated to quantify uncertainty. Fine-tuned BioClinicalBERT models achieved near-perfect performance, with macro F1 scores >=0.998 on the internal test set. External validation confirmed robustness (macro F1=0.966), outperforming conventional machine learning, general-domain BERT models, and various decoder-only large language models. NLP models, particularly fine-tuned clinical variants like BioClinicalBERT, offer a highly accurate and scalable solution for overdose death classification from free-text reports. These methods can significantly accelerate surveillance workflows, overcoming the limitations of manual ICD-10 coding and supporting near real-time detection of emerging substance use trends.

The increasing interest in research and innovation towards the development of autonomous agents presents a number of complex yet important scenarios of multiple AI Agents interacting with each other in an environment. The particular setting can be understood as exhibiting three possibly topologies of interaction - centrally coordinated cooperation, ad-hoc interaction and cooperation, and settings with noncooperative incentive structures. This article presents a comprehensive survey of all three domains, defined under the formalism of Federal Reinforcement Learning (RL), Decentralized RL, and Noncooperative RL, respectively. Highlighting the structural similarities and distinctions, we review the state of the art in these subjects, primarily explored and developed only recently in the literature. We include the formulations as well as known theoretical guarantees and highlights and limitations of numerical performance.

The Control as Inference (CAI) framework has successfully transformed single-agent reinforcement learning (RL) by reframing control tasks as probabilistic inference problems. However, the extension of CAI to multi-agent, general-sum stochastic games (SGs) remains underexplored, particularly in decentralized settings where agents operate independently without centralized coordination. In this paper, we propose a novel variational inference framework tailored to decentralized multi-agent systems. Our framework addresses the challenges posed by non-stationarity and unaligned agent objectives, proving that the resulting policies form an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium. Additionally, we demonstrate theoretical convergence guarantees for the proposed decentralized algorithms. Leveraging this framework, we instantiate multiple algorithms to solve for Nash equilibrium, mean-field Nash equilibrium, and correlated equilibrium, with rigorous theoretical convergence analysis.

Mean-field reinforcement learning has become a popular theoretical framework for efficiently approximating large-scale multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) problems exhibiting symmetry. However, questions remain regarding the applicability of mean-field approximations: in particular, their approximation accuracy of real-world systems and conditions under which they become computationally tractable. We establish explicit finite-agent bounds for how well the MFG solution approximates the true $N$-player game for two popular mean-field solution concepts. Furthermore, for the first time, we establish explicit lower bounds indicating that MFGs are poor or uninformative at approximating $N$-player games assuming only Lipschitz dynamics and rewards. Finally, we analyze the computational complexity of solving MFGs with only Lipschitz properties and prove that they are in the class of \textsc{PPAD}-complete problems conjectured to be intractable, similar to general sum $N$ player games. Our theoretical results underscore the limitations of MFGs and complement and justify existing work by proving difficulty in the absence of common theoretical assumptions.

Recent techniques based on Mean Field Games (MFGs) allow the scalable analysis of multi-player games with many similar, rational agents. However, standard MFGs remain limited to homogeneous players that weakly influence each other, and cannot model major players that strongly influence other players, severely limiting the class of problems that can be handled. We propose a novel discrete time version of major-minor MFGs (M3FGs), along with a learning algorithm based on fictitious play and partitioning the probability simplex. Importantly, M3FGs generalize MFGs with common noise and can handle not only random exogeneous environment states but also major players. A key challenge is that the mean field is stochastic and not deterministic as in standard MFGs. Our theoretical investigation verifies both the M3FG model and its algorithmic solution, showing firstly the well-posedness of the M3FG model starting from a finite game of interest, and secondly convergence and approximation guarantees of the fictitious play algorithm. Then, we empirically verify the obtained theoretical results, ablating some of the theoretical assumptions made, and show successful equilibrium learning in three example problems. Overall, we establish a learning framework for a novel and broad class of tractable games.

Motivated by bid recommendation in online ad auctions, this paper considers a general class of multi-level and multi-agent games, with two major characteristics: one is a large number of anonymous agents, and the other is the intricate interplay between competition and cooperation. To model such complex systems, we propose a novel and tractable bi-objective optimization formulation with mean-field approximation, called MESOB (Mean-field Equilibria & Social Optimality Balancing), as well as an associated occupation measure optimization (OMO) method called MESOB-OMO to solve it. MESOB-OMO enables obtaining approximately Pareto efficient solutions in terms of the dual objectives of competition and cooperation in MESOB, and in particular allows for Nash equilibrium selection and social equalization in an asymptotic manner. We apply MESOB-OMO to bid recommendation in a simulated pay-per-click ad auction. Experiments demonstrate its efficacy in balancing the interests of different parties and in handling the competitive nature of bidders, as well as its advantages over baselines that only consider either the competitive or the cooperative aspects.

We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms, including gradient-based methods, the exponential / multiplicative weights algorithm for learning in finite games, optimistic and bandit variants of the above, etc. In addition to providing an integrated view of these algorithms, our framework further allows us to obtain several new convergence results, both asymptotic and in finite time, in both continuous and finite games. Specifically, we provide a range of criteria for identifying classes of Nash equilibria and sets of action profiles that are attracting with high probability, and we also introduce the notion of coherence, a game-theoretic property that includes strict and sharp equilibria, and which leads to convergence in finite time. Importantly, our analysis applies to both oracle-based and bandit, payoff-based methods - that is, when players only observe their realized payoffs.

We introduce networked communication to the mean-field game framework. In particular, we look at oracle-free settings where $N$ decentralised agents learn along a single, non-episodic evolution path of the empirical system, such as we may encounter for a large range of many-agent cooperation problems in the real-world. We provide theoretical evidence that by spreading improved policies through the network in a decentralised fashion, our sample guarantees are upper-bounded by those of the purely independent-learning case. Moreover, we show empirically that our networked method can give faster convergence in practice, while removing the reliance on a centralised controller. We also demonstrate that our decentralised communication architecture brings significant benefits over both the centralised and independent alternatives in terms of robustness and flexibility to unexpected learning failures and changes in population size. For comparison purposes with our new architecture, we modify recent algorithms for the centralised and independent cases to make their practical convergence feasible: while contributing the first empirical demonstrations of these algorithms in our setting of $N$ agents learning along a single system evolution with only local state observability, we additionally display the empirical benefits of our new, networked approach.

Modeling and control of epidemics such as the novel Corona virus have assumed paramount importance at a global level. A natural and powerful dynamical modeling framework to use in this context is a continuous time Markov decision process (CTMDP) that encompasses classical compartmental paradigms such as the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model. The challenges with CTMDP based models motivate the need for a more efficient approach and the mean field approach offers an effective alternative. The mean field approach computes the collective behavior of a dynamical system comprising numerous interacting nodes (where nodes represent individuals in the population). This paper (a) presents an overview of the mean field approach to epidemic modeling and control and (b) provides a state-of-the-art update on recent advances on this topic. Our discussion in this paper proceeds along two specific threads. The first thread assumes that the individual nodes faithfully follow a socially optimal control policy prescribed by a regulatory authority. The second thread allows the individual nodes to exhibit independent, strategic behavior. In this case, the strategic interaction is modeled as a mean field game and the control is based on the associated mean field Nash equilibria. In this paper, we start with a discussion of modeling of epidemics using an extended compartmental model - SIVR and provide an illustrative example. We next provide a review of relevant literature, using a mean field approach, on optimal control of epidemics, dealing with how a regulatory authority may optimally contain epidemic spread in a population. Following this, we provide an update on the literature on the use of the mean field game based approach in the study of epidemic spread and control. We conclude the paper with relevant future research directions.